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RESHAPING THE LAST MILE:
AMENDING THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT




Idaho was recently designated the slowest state in the United States
("U.S.") in terms of Internet connection speeds.1 The Internet is so slow in
Idaho that it takes its residents nearly three times as long to download a
standard music file as residents of Rhode Island, the state with the fastest
Internet speeds in the country.2 Slow download and upload speeds make it
difficult to use any video conferencing technology such as Skype, or to
stream any high-resolution video. Unfortunately, this disparity in Internet
connection speeds between rural and urban areas is common in the U.S.
because of the difficulty of building infrastructure in rural locations. 3
One result of this situation is that the U.S. has begun to lag behind other
countries in the performance of broadband. 4 A survey of the thirty-four
countries that comprise the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
* J.D., St. John's University School of Law, June 2013; B.A., State University of New York at New
Paltz, December 2008.
1 Katharine Q. Seelye, For Idaho and the Internet, Life in the Slow Lane, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14,
2011, at A24. According to the article, the average download speed for residential customers in Idaho is
318 kilobytes per second. Id.
2 See id. ("In Idaho, it would take you 9.42 seconds to download a standard music file compared
with 3.36 seconds in Rhode Island, the state with the fastest average speeds, at 894 kilobytes per
second.").
3 See id. ("Idaho encapsulates some of the challenges for mountain states. [T]he state is
crisscrossed by a series of peaks, ridges, forests, high plateaus and river valleys, making it expensive to
lay cable or build towers."). Because of such expenses, broadband Internet providers often have little
financial incentives to provide high-speed access to residents in rural areas. See id.
4 The term "broadband" as used in this Note refers specifically to broadband Internet access. This is
merely for the sake of brevity. It should be noted that "broadband" encompasses other means of
communication as well. See JOHN THORNE ET AL., FEDERAL BROADBAND LAW 2 (1995) (defining
broadband as "the technology for transmitting huge volumes of information through wireline and
wireless media."). This Note focuses upon wireline broadband, and does not address many issues
surrounding competition among wireless broadband providers.
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Development ("OECD")5 ranked the U.S. at fourteenth in percentage of
households with broadband access.6 A 2011 study of broadband connection
speeds worldwide ranked the U.S. twenty-sixth in that category.7 In a
survey of the median prices of monthly broadband subscriptions per
country, the U.S. was ranked thirty-first. 8
These statistics are alarming given the important economic and social
benefits that broadband provides. 9 For example, companies in South Korea
have benefitted economically by achieving nearly universal broadband
adoption.O A majority of American adults are now using social networking
sites like Facebook or LinkedIn, making broadband an important method of
social interaction.11
Broadband connection speeds are important because they affect the
5 The OECD is an international organization that was founded in 1960 with the goal of promoting
economic development. Its membership includes nearly half of Europe, as well as Canada, Japan, South
Korea, and the United States, among others. See Members and Partners, ORGANISATION FOR ECON.
CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800 1_1_1_1 _,00.html (last visited Mar. 14,
2014).
6 OECD Broadband Portal, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. Figure 2a,
http://www.oecd.org/sti/broadband/oecdbroadbandportal.htm#Usage (last updated Jan. 9, 2014)
[hereinafter OECD Broadband Portal]. Specifically, the OECD found that 68.2% of United States
households have access to broadband, compared to 97.5% in the top ranked country, South Korea. Id.
7 See Ed Zitron, Pando Networks Releases Global Internet Speed Study, PANDONETWORKS.COM
(Sept. 22, 2011), http://www.pandonetworks.com//company/news/pando-networks-releases-global-
internet-speed-study (accessed at http://archive.is/eZ2j6).
8 OECD Broadband Portal, supra note 6, Figure 4e. Other studies have also indicated that the
United States is behind in these and other categories measuring broadband markets. See infra Part TB.
9 See Robert Crandall, William Lehr & Robert Litan, The Effects of Broadband Deployment on
Output and Employment: A Cross-Sectional Analysis of US. Data, ISSUES IN ECON. POLY 1, 2 (July
2007), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2007/061aborcrandall/061abor-crandall.pdf ("[F]or
every one percentage point increase in broadband penetration in a state, employment is projected to
increase by 0.2 to 0.3 percent per year."); Lee Rainie, Dir., Pew Research Ctr. Internet & Am. Life
Project, The Perfect People Meter: My Beautiful Fantasy About Understanding Audience in the Digital
Age, Speech at the Advertising Research Foundation Conference 6.0 (June 13, 2011), available at
http://pewinternet.org/Presentations/2011/Jun/Advertising-Audience-Measurement.aspx ("[The Internet
has led] to proliferation of niches and communities - literally countless numbers of them.").
10 See Eric Pfanner, Expanding Broadband to Bail Out Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/25/technology/25iht-broadband.4.20433456.html?pagewanted=all
("For South Korea, the benefits of nearly universal broadband . . . have been significant. With a
population of 50 million highly wired - and wireless - consumers as a test market for new devices,
South Korean consumer electronics manufacturers like Samsung and LG have transformed themselves
from lumbering makers of low-end products to the most dynamic players in their industry."). The article
also states that investments in telecommunications networks generally result in positive economic
returns. For example, the article states that economic models show that for every $1 spent on network
improvements, there is an increase in gross domestic product of $1.30. Id.
11 See Mary Madden & Kathryn Zickuhr, 65 % of Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites, PEW
RES. CENTER INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2011),
http://pewinternetorg/Reports/2011/Social-Networking-Sites.aspx. The amount of adults using social
networking sites rose 4 percent between 2010 and 2011. Among people ages 50-64, usage of such sites
rose 60 percent during that time. Id.
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quality and usefulness of a person's Internet experience.12 Faster speeds
allow users to run applications such as streaming video, and also permit
faster file transfers.13 For the U.S. to compete economically with the rest of
the world, it is essential that it offer consumers fast speeds.14 High-speed
broadband also contributes to the development of new services and
business models.' 5 For example, high-speed Internet allows for advanced
applications such as real-time two-way videoconferencing.16 These
applications allow for real-time collaborations on data intensive projects,
such as building computer-aided designs for engineering or
manufacturing.' 7 Finally, broadband prices matter because they have a
significant impact on the amount of people who can afford access. 18
In light of the importance of broadband, other countries have
implemented policies designed to promote competition between broadband
providers, which have resulted in faster connection speeds and lower
prices.19  Yet in the U.S., the Federal Communications Commission
("Commission") has taken a hands-off approach in its regulatory policy
towards broadband, not imposing any similar mandates designed to achieve
greater competition. Instead, it has deregulated broadband by classifying it
as an "information service" within the meaning of the Telecommunications
12 See Cecilia Kang, Survey Maps Out Digital Divide, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2011 at A16 ("Speed
matters, experts say, because consumers with better Internet connections can be more productive and
get more out of the Web.").
13 Stephen Ezell et al., The Need for Speed: The Importance of Next-Generation Broadband
Networks, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. 5 (Mar. 2009), available at
http://www.itif.org/files/2009-needforspeed.pdf.
14 See Kang, supra note 12 ("[President] Obama has said that networks with at least 10 megabit-
per-second download speeds are key to competing economically with countries that have cutting-edge
Intemet services, such as South Korea and Germany.").
15 See Ezell et al., supra note 13, at 27 ("Next-generation broadband will be crucial for the
competitiveness of small businesses and large corporations alike. Furthermore, next-generation
broadband contributes to the development of new business models, services, and forms of corporate
organization.").
16 See id. at 29. Another example of an application that takes advantage of high-speed Broadband
is South Korea's use of real-time transfers for Internet shopping. South Korea's banking system has
installed a real-time direct settlement capability, allowing banking transactions to go through the
Intemet using this payment system. This system eliminated the need to use credit cards to shop on the
Internet. Id. at 29.
17 See id. at 28. Such "telepresence" applications also reduce travel costs insofar as they create an
adequate substitute for real face-to-face interaction, allowing for high definition audio and video. One
company that has adopted this technology, Cisco, reported that it expected to save $400 million in
travel expenses in 2009. Id. at 28.
18 See Summary of Final National Broadband Plan Reply Comments, FREE PRESS (Jan. 2010),
http://www.freepress.net/files/Summary ofFreePressFinalNationalBroadbandPlan Reply Com
ments.pdf ("Lower prices ... will go a long way towards closing the adoption gap.").
19 See Leila Abboud, How France Became a Leader in Offering Faster Broadband, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 28, 2006, at BI (explaining that French regulators were able to spur competition between
broadband companies by requiring bigger companies to make their infrastructure available to smaller
competitors), available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114351413029509718.html.
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Act of 1996 ("1996 Act").20 This allows broadband providers to avoid
many of the regulations that are enforced on entities classified as
"telecommunications services" under that law.21 A "telecommunications
service" is a service that transmits information between users, while an
"information service" transforms or alters information that is transmitted
between users in some way.2 2 The former category is subject to the
common carrier regulations of the 1996 Act, while the latter is not.23
Common carriers are regulated under Title II of the 1996 Act, which
includes provisions allowing the Commission to implement policies
designed to increase competition in their market.24 As a result of the
decision to classify broadband as an "information service," the Commission
is now without any significant statutory authority to regulate competition
among broadband providers.25
Without the Commission regulating competition in the broadband
20 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
21 See FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY COMPETITION POLICY 3 (2007)
[hereinafter FTC Report], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/broadband-connectivity-competition-
policy/v070000report.pdf ("[S]ince about 2000, the FCC has undertaken a substantial and systematic
deregulation of broadband services and facilities, concluding that cable, wireline, powerline and
wireless broadband Internet access services are 'information services'....").
22 See id. at 42, n. 179 ("In brief, to act simply as a transmitter or transducer of information is to
provide a telecommunications service, whereas to act as a transformer of information is to provide an
information service.").
23 See id.
24 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERICAN
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 70 (2005) (stating that there is some consensus
that Congress designed the Telecommunications Act to produce long term, local competition); THORNE
ET AL., supra note 4, § 3.1 at 70 (noting that Title I of the Communications Act sets forth the
Commission's authority over common carriers).
25 See Marc S. Martin, Martin L. Stern & Peter W. Denton, FCC Seeks Comment on Its "Third
Way" Approach to Regulating Broadband Internet Service, 15 CYBERSPACE LAW. 17, at 17 (2010)
("[T]he Commission, based on its prior decision classifying cable modem service as an unregulated
information service, lack[s] direct statutory authority to regulate broadband Internet service .... ). As
this Note was going to press, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided another case involving the
Commission's authority to regulate broadband. In Verizon v. Fed Commn'cs Comm'n, No. 11-1355(D.C. Cir. Jan. 14, 2014), the D.C. Circuit again overturned Commission rules that were designed to
promote "net neutrality." See id. at 4. In deciding the case, the D.C. Circuit for the first time recognized
that Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act grants the Commission substantive authority to enact
regulations promoting the deployment of broadband infrastructure. Id. Nonetheless, this new
substantive authority could not contravene express prohibitions in the Communications Act. Id. With
respect to the net neutrality rules at issue in Verizon, the Court held that the Communications Act
prohibited "information services" from being regulated as common carriers. Id. Thus, the Commission's
decision to classify broadband as an "information service" rather than a "telecommunications service"
prevented it from using Section 706 to impose any sort of common carrier regulations. To the extent
Verizon is relevant to this Note, it does not represent a significant change in the law governing the
Commission's authority to carry out the sort of policies proposed herein. Whatever authority Section
706, as currently written, now provides to the Commission, the classification of broadband as an
"information service" still provides a barrier to the implementation of any significant measures designed
to promote competition.
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market, the results have been predictable. According to a survey by the
Commission in 2010, most residents in the United States have a choice
between only two different broadband providers - a duopoly.26 Lack of
competition has been a significant cause in the failure of the U.S. to
provide its citizens with speeds and prices that compare to those of other
OECD nations.27
This Note proposes that the Commission should reverse its current
approach to broadband and instead implement specific regulatory policies
that would promote competition, and thus faster connection speeds and
lower prices. This Note further advocates that Congress amend Section
70628 of the 1996 Act to provide the Commission with the express
authority to implement such policies.
Part I of this Note examines broadband markets in the U.S. and abroad,
providing a brief description of the technology and comparing broadband
performance, prices and adoption rates among various countries. Part II
describes the current legal and regulatory framework governing
telecommunications in the United States, and explains where broadband
has fit within that framework. Part III discusses the Commission's "Third
Way" proposal, and compares it to various regulatory actions the
Commission could take under Section 706 that would promote competition
and be consistent with the policies underlying that provision. Part IV
proposes an amendment to Section 706 of the 1996 Act that would grant
the Commission express authority to implement these policies. Part IV also
examines several alternative proposals that have been offered that would
grant the Commission authority to regulate broadband, and explains why
those proposals would be less effective.
I. BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD
A. Broadband Technology
The Internet allows computers to share information.29 The "physical
26 See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTING AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN 37
(2010) (noting that 78 percent of United States residents live in markets with only two wireline
broadband providers) [hereinafter National Broadband Plan].
27 See id. at 36 ("Competition provides consumers the benefits of choice, better service and lower
prices.").
28 42 U.S.C. § 1302 (2012).
29 See GEORGE B. DELTA & JEFFREY H. MATSUURA, LAW OF THE INTERNET § 1.02 (2011) (noting
that the Internet allows computers to be "interconnected" in the sense that they can share information).
This information is sent and received by computers in the form of binary digits (or "bits"), which are
used as a mathematical code for all kinds of media, including sounds and images. See NUECHTERLEIN
2014
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layer"30 of the Internet consists of the actual means of communication over
which computers send and receive information. 31 The physical layer
consists of transmission "pipes," such as copper wires or fiber-optic cables,
through which the information travels, and "switches," which route
transmissions of information from one pipe to another.32 The "pipes" that
connect end users to the nearest "switch" are often referred to as "last mile"
facilities. 33
When residential Internet access was first made commercially available,
most users connected by using dial-up telephone connections. 34 However,
dial-up's connection speed limits the kinds of applications it can support.35
By contrast, broadband connections offer much faster speeds, 36 allowing
for applications such as streaming high-resolution video. 37
Broadband technology can be provided to consumers in a variety of
ways. 38 The types of broadband include coaxial cable wirelines, digital
subscriber lines (DSL), fiber-optic wirelines, wireless, satellite, and
broadband-over power lines. 39 Increasing use has been made of fiber-optic
lines rather than traditional copper lines through the entire physical layer of
the Interet.40 Fiber has exceptionally high bandwidth, or data carrying
capacity, as compared to copper wires, which have much more limited
bandwidth. 4 1
& WEISER, supra note 24, at 115.
30 Nuechterlein and Weiser use this term as shorthand for the physical infrastructure through which
bits travel. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 120.
31 Id. at 120-21.
32 Id.
33 Id at 131.
34 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 19. Dial-up technology permits computers to transmit data at
maximum speeds of 56,000 bits (or 56 kilobits) per second. Id. Transmission speeds are measured in
bits per second (bps). As used in this Note, "Kbps" refers to kilobits per second, where 1 Kbps denotes
a transmission speed of 1,000 bits per second. "Mbps" refers to megabits per second, where 1 Mbps
denotes a transmission speed of 1,000,000 bits per second.
35 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 134.
36 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 19. The Commission has defined broadband as a service that
permits transmission speeds of at least 200 kbps. Id at 19 n.54.
37 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 139.
38 See FTC Report, supra note 21, at 24.
39 Id. at 2. DSL is provided over traditional copper telephone lines in which portions of those
facilities are dedicated to the transmission of bits. See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 141.
Cable wirelines permit users to access the Internet using wires created for traditional cable television
service. See id,
40 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 141.
41 See id. at 35-36. Verizon's FiOS service is one example of a broadband connection that uses
fiber-optics in its last-mile facilities, often referred to as fiber-to-the-premises. See National Broadband
Plan, supra note 26, at 20.
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B. Broadband Markets
Broadband adoption rates in the U.S. have steadily risen over the last
decade.42 An estimate from August 2013 provided that approximately 70
percent of American adults (ages 18 and older) have home broadband
connections. 43 In 2011, the U.S. Department of Commerce released a
report that stated that Internet adoption overall stands at 68 percent of all
households in the U.S. 44 Approximately 18 million Americans live in areas
with no broadband access.45 It is also estimated that approximately 80
million adults do not use broadband at home.46 This data suggests that for a
substantial number of Americans, while there is access to infrastructure that
would provide broadband, they simply have chosen not to purchase
access.
47
Further support for the assertion that price has a significant impact on
broadband adoption is provided by the 2011 Commerce Department report.
The report states that low-income individuals were less likely to use
broadband at home than those with higher incomes. 48 In particular, those
families earning less than $15,000 annually had a 32.1 percent adoption
rate, while the adoption rate for families earning more than $150,000 was
89.6 percent.49 Although this correlation might be caused by other factors
in addition to income, a significant number of households that did not have
home broadband surveyed in the report, 25.3 percent, listed "too
expensive" as their reason for not adopting broadband, while only 3.1
percent of those surveyed stated that their reason for not adopting
broadband was because they did not have access to infrastructure. 50 Again,
this data suggests that for a significant amount of residents in the U.S., the
42 See Katheryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Home Broadband 2013, PEW RES. CENTER INTERNET &
AM. LIFE PROJECT (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/08/26/home-broadband-2013/.
43 Id.
44 NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, DIGITAL NATION: EXPANDING
INTERNET USAGE 2 (2011), available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia-internet use report-february-2011 .pdf [hereinafter
US. Department of Commerce Report]; see Kang, supra note 12.
45 Julius Genachowski, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Remarks on Broadband Adoption
(Oct. 12, 2011), available at http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-genachowski-broadband-
adoption.
46 Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Americans, 26 FCC Rcd. 8008, 8037
58 (2011) (Seventh Broadband Progress Report and Order on Reconsideration).
47 See US. Department of Commerce Report, supra note 44, at 5 ("For households that do not
connect to broadband, the reason given most frequently for non-adoption was 'don't need/not interested,'
followed by 'too expensive."').
48 Id. at 8.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 20.
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problem is not lack of access, but rather prohibitive cost.51
Another troubling aspect of broadband adoption in the U.S. is the racial
and ethnic disparity among those with broadband and those without. The
Commerce Department report, for example, estimated broadband adoption
rates of white non-Hispanics at 68.3 percent, while black non-Hispanics
had an adoption rate of only 49.9 percent.52 A 2010 survey of home
broadband adoption rates among various demographics by the Pew Internet
& American Life Project estimated an 11 percentage-point gap between
adoption rates among whites (67 percent) and African-Americans (56
percent). 53 The group noted that the broadband adoption rate among
African-Americans had grown by 10 percent between 2009 and 2010, from
an adoption rate of 46 percent in 2009 to 56 percent in 2010.54 Among
Latino/Hispanic citizens, there is a disparity in broadband adoption
between native-born Latinos and foreign-born Latinos. While 85 percent of
native-born Latinos surveyed in a 2010 Pew study had used the Internet,
only 51 percent of foreign-born Latinos used the Intemet.55 Unfortunately
for some Latinos, language has been a significant barrier to broadband
adoption. 56 Overall, Hispanics had a broadband adoption rate of 45.2
percent.57 Although reduction in disparities in broadband adoption among
racial/ethnic groups is an encouraging sign, further action by the
Commission should be taken to ensure that there is no gap in broadband
adoption among racial or ethnic demographics.
51 The Commission's 2010 National Broadband Plan also surveyed broadband adoption rates
among various income levels, with results similar to those of the Commerce Department's study. The
Commission's research showed that approximately 40 percent of adults making less than $20,000 per
year had adopted broadband at home, while 93 percent of adults making more than $75,000 had
broadband at home. National Broadband Plan, supra note 26, at 23.
52 US. Department of Commerce Report, supra note 44, at 11. The rate of adoption was lowest
among Hispanics, who had an adoption rate of 45.2 percent. Id. The report did note, however, that
disparities in adoption rates among different racial and ethnic groups seemed to be slightly narrowing,
as the adoption rates among black non-Hispanics, American Indian/Alaskan Native non-Hispanics, and
Hispanics all increased from 2009 to 2010. Id.
53 AARON SMITH, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, Home Broadband 2010 2 (2010), available
at http://www.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2010/Home%20broadband%202010.pdf.
54 Id.
55 Gretchen Livingston, The Latino Digital Divide: The Native Born versus the Foreign Born, PEW
RES. CENTER HisP. TRENDS PROJECT (July 28, 2010), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2010/07/28/the-
latino-digital-divide-the-native-bom-versus-the-foreign-born/.
56 See Susannah Fox & Gretchen Livingston, Latinos Online: Hispanics with Lower Levels of
Education and English Proficiency Remain Largely Disconnected from the Internet, PEW RES. CENTER
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT i (Mar. 14, 2007),
http://web.pewintemet.org/-/media//Files/Reports/2007/LatinosOnlineMarch 14 2007.pdf.pdf.
Specifically, the report noted that 78 percent of Latinos who are English-dominant and 76 percent of
bilingual Latinos used the Internet, compared with 32 percent of Spanish-dominant Hispanic adults. Id.
at 9.
57 US. Department of Commerce Report, supra note 44, at 11.
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Comparing adoption rates in the United States to other nations evidences
that the U.S. is behind. As stated above, the OECD data rank the United
States at fourteenth among member countries in terms of the percentage of
residents who have home broadband access. 58  As to particular
technologies, the OECD ranks the United States as twenty-seventh out of
thirty in DSL coverage, first out of twenty-eight in cable modem coverage,
and sixth out of sixteen in fiber-to-the-premises coverage. 59
Connection speeds are another important measure of broadband markets.
Advertised download speeds for broadband in the U.S. have increased by
approximately 20 percent per year over the past decade. 60 Additionally,
American broadband providers plan future upgrades to their facilities that
they anticipate will raise adoption rates and speeds. 61 In 2010, the
Commission predicted that these upgrades would allow 90 percent of the
country to have access to advertised download speeds of more than 50
Mbps by 2013.62
However, again, international comparisons indicate the U.S. is behind a
number of other countries in this category. One recent study estimated the
average worldwide download speed as 580 Kbps, with the United States
only slightly higher at 616 Kbps, placing it at a rank of twenty-sixth
worldwide. 63 By contrast, the top four countries were South Korea (2.2
Mbps), Romania (1.9 Mbps), Bulgaria (1.6 Mbps) and Lithuania (1.4
MVbps). 64 Even in studies where the U.S. did more favorably, they were not
within the top ten in connection speeds.65 While some critics of these types
of studies fault them for failing to take into account disparities between
more rural and urban countries, others argue that greater investments in
infrastructure and competition among broadband providers have allowed
other countries to surpass the U.S. in terms of connection speeds.66
58 In the Matter of International Comparison Requirements Pursuant to the Broadband Data
Improvement Act, 26 FCC Red. 7378, 7381 par. 9 (2011).
59 Id. at 7831 para. 8.
60 National Broadband Plan, supra note 26, at 20.
61 See id.
62 Id. at20-21.
63 Zitron, supra note 7.
64 Id.
65 See Catharine Smith, Top 19 Countries With the Fastest Internet Connection Speeds Ranked by
Akamai, HUFFINGTONPOST.COM (Nov. 18, 2010, 7:32 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.con2010/11/18/fastest-internet-connection-
speed n 783865.html#s182459&title=19France (last updated May 25, 2011) (ranking the United
States at #12).
66 See Nate Anderson, Broadband: Other Countries Do it Better, But How?, ARSTECHNICA.COM
(May 11, 2008, 8:37 PM), http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/05/broadband-other-countries-do-it-
better-but-how.ars (noting a common criticism of the OECD broadband rankings is that they cover
countries with greater population density than the United States, but that the countries ranked ahead of
2014
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Current prices for broadband subscriptions in the U.S. range from $27.49
per month to $221.52 per month, with a median price of $54.35 per month
.67 For connections with a 2.5 Mbps speed, the median price per month
paid by American consumers is $43.95, while the median monthly price for
connections that provide speeds of 30 Mbps is $73.32.68
A recent study has indicated that prices in the U.S. for broadband have
remained fairly steady between 2007 and 2009, rising by two percent, 69
while in most other OECD countries prices have fallen.70 In countries like
France and Belgium, prices fell over 40 percent during that period, with
decreases in prices of at least 10 percent occurring in Spain, Japan and
Sweden. 71
The OECD also measures the median prices per country for various
broadband connection speeds, which further reveals the significant price
differences between the U.S. and other countries. For example, a
September 2012 study by the OECD revealed that the median monthly
subscription price for a connection speed faster than 45 Mbps in the U.S.
was $89.82, while in Japan, the median monthly subscription price for
speeds faster than 45 Mbps was $30.18.72 Out of the thirty-four countries
surveyed, the U.S. was ranked thirty-first in terms of countries offering the
cheapest median monthly subscription price for a connection speed faster
than 45 Mbps.73 This disparity in prices between the U.S. and other
countries decreases as the speed of the broadband connection offered
decreases. For example, for connection speeds of at least 15 Mbps, the
median monthly subscription price in the U.S. was $43.99, while in Korea,
the top country for that category, the median monthly subscription price
was $16.35.74 In the 15 Mbps category,.the U.S. was ranked twenty-sixth
the United States also have greater investment and competition in their broadband markets).
67 OECD Broadband Portal, supra note 6, List of broadband offers used for prices and speeds.
68 Id. Figures 4e, 4g. The OECD measures the price of broadband subscriptions based on a
"basket" approach whereby they survey different types of users and calculate the cost of broadband for
each type of user. Thus, the OECD provides data on cost for both low and high usage of broadband. All
references in the text are to the cost of "low" broadband usage.
69 Matthew Lasar, Broadband Prices Dropping Around the World, But Not US, ARSTECHNICA.COM
(Dec. 15, 2010, 7:40 PM) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/12/residential-broadband-
prices-falling-but-not-in-us.ars.
70 Id.
71 SCOTT WALLSTEN & JAMES L. Riso, TECHNOLOGY POLICY INSTITUTE, RESIDENTIAL AND
BUSINESS BROADBAND PRICES PART 2: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 27 (2010), available at
http://techpolicyinstitute.org/files/residential%20and%20business%2Obroadband%20prices%20pt2.pdf.
72 OECD Broadband Portal, supra note 6, Figure 4h. Other countries with the lower prices for
these high-speed connections include Iceland ($48.93per month), Finland ($46.81 per month) and
Sweden (S 41.01 per month). Id.
73 Id.
74 Portal, supra note 6, Figure 4f.
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out of thirty-four countries in terms of the cheapest median monthly
subscription price.75 The U.S. had the third most expensive median
monthly subscription rate for broadband connection speeds of at least 2.5
Mbps, out of thirty-four countries surveyed by the OECD in September
2012.76 What is troubling about this information is the fact that the U.S. is
much farther behind the rest of the OECD countries in offering low cost,
yet high-speed connections.
The disparity in broadband speeds and prices between the U.S. and other
OECD nations can partly be explained by a variety of factors that are
beyond the control of the Commission - geography, population density,
and housing, to name a few.77 However, differences in population density
and geography cannot explain all of the differences in broadband
performance. The Commission's 2011 International Broadband Data Report
compared data on download speeds among a number of U.S. cities and
foreign cities, concluding that "mean actual download speeds in some
European and Asian cities are substantially higher than in comparably sized
U.S. cities." 78 Moreover, some countries with lower population density
than the U.S. nonetheless have greater broadband adoption rates.79 Thus,
population density and geography cannot account for all of the differences
in broadband performance among various countries.
One factor that affects speeds and prices is competition, which is within
the Commission's ability to promote. Studies have demonstrated that the
U.S. broadband market has little competition, and is currently an oligopoly,
with only a small number of firms in the market. For example, the
Commission, in its National Broadband Plan, stated that 78 percent of
Americans live in areas that are served by only two broadband providers. 80
A 2010 study of the state of broadband competition in the U.S. concluded
that in half of the U.S. the broadband market is a duopoly. 81 Even some
75 Id.
76 Id. Figure 4e.
77 See ROBERT D. ATKINSON, THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY & INNOVATION FOUNDATION, THE
TRUTH, AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH ABOUT U.S. INTERNATIONAL BROADBAND RANKINGS 1 (2010),
available at http://www.itif.org/files/2010-BB-rankings.pdf (arguing that some of the disparity in
international rankings between the United States and countries like Japan or South Korea can be
explained by the fact that they are more densely populated than the United States).
78 International Broadband Data Report, supra note 58, at 7384 para. 15. As an example, the
Commission noted that download speeds were measured at 24.8 Mbps in Paris and 35.8 Mbps in Seoul
versus 6.9 Mbps in San Francisco and 9.4 Mbps in Chicago. Id.
79 Id. at 7400-11. To take two examples, Norway and Iceland both have lower population density
than the United States, but have a higher broadband adoption rate. Id
80 National Broadband Plan, supra note 26, at 37.
81 ADAM ELLIOTT & CRAIG SETTLES, THE STATE OF BROADBAND COMPETITION IN AMERICA -
2010 8-9 (2010), available at http://gigaom.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/pdf-broadband-competition-
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states that have two providers have a 30 percent gap in market share
between the two providers, which is closer to a monopoly. 82
C. Effects of Broadband Usage on Society
These statistics have serious economic and societal consequences for the
U.S. Broadband connections must be fast and reliable if companies are
going to continue to create applications and content for consumers who
make use of those connections. 83 The rising speed of broadband
connections has been closely correlated with increasing use of the
Internet.84 The average Internet user today consumes 9,000 Megabytes of
data per month over his/her connection.85 Moreover, the Commission
estimates that total data use per fixed residential connection is growing by
roughly 30 percent per year.86 If broadband usage is to continue to grow, it
is necessary that speeds continue to increase to meet demand for data
consumption.
But what types of data are people consuming? The Commission's 2010
National Broadband Plan surveyed home broadband users to determine
how they use their connections, and the results show that broadband serves
important functions. For example, 83 percent of all broadband users have
bought a product online, 80 percent have obtained local news, 79 percent
have visited a local, state or federal government website, and 60 percent
obtained information on or applied for a job.87 It can hardly be disputed
that these activities both help to fuel the economy and provide access to
important information, and encouraging more people to use these services
would benefit society and the economy as a whole.
In addition, new applications are being developed that require
significantly higher bandwidth.88 To name just two examples, streaming
live video for classroom lectures and two-way video teleconferencing are
research-report-4-22-10-final.pdf ("Contrary to claims of those who feel the U.S. has 'robust broadband
competition,' it is clear that half of the states have a duopoly rather than true competitive markets....
Even in the most competitive states, the bottom five competitors have 3% market share or less.").
82 Id. at 8.
83 See National Broadband Plan, supra note 26, at 15 ("Networks, devices and applications drive
each other in a virtuous cycle. If networks are fast, reliable and widely available, companies produce
more powerful, more capable devices to connect to those networks. These devices, in turn, encourage
innovators and entrepreneurs to develop exciting applications and content.").
84 Id. at 16. Specifically, the Commission notes that average home broadband use increased from




88 See id. at 17 (noting, for example, that consumers are increasingly using high-bandwidth
applications such as videoconferencing and cloud computing).
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both applications that require faster connections than those needed for
traditional e-mail and web browsing applications. 89 Only access to high-
speed broadband connections will allow for users to enjoy the benefits of
these applications.
Adoption rates also have serious economic consequences. A February
2006 study showed that communities that have access to broadband
experience more rapid growth in employment and business development
than communities that do not have broadband access. 90 Another study
indicated that for every one percentage point increase in broadband
adoption in a state, employment in that state increases by 0.2 to 0.3
percent. 91 Broadband usage provides significant benefits both to consumers
and society. To promote further broadband adoption and economic
development, it is necessary to achieve faster connection speeds and lower
subscription prices.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BROADBAND
To understand how the federal government could achieve greater
broadband competition, it is necessary to explore the legal framework in
which federal regulators operate.
A. Common Carrier Regulation and the Communications Act of 1934
The modem framework of telecommunications law was created with the
passage of the Communications Act of 1934 ("1934 Act"). 92 The 1934 Act
established the Commission, an independent federal agency charged with
"regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and
radio."93 This Act is the principal source of the Commission's authority,
89 Id.
90 LENNARD G. KRUGER & ANGELE A. GILROY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 30719, BROADBAND
INTERNET ACCESS AND THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 6 (2011) ("A February
2006 study done by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ... found that 'between 1998 and 2002,
communities in which mass-market broadband was available by December 1999 experienced more
rapid growth in employment, the number of businesses overall, and businesses in IT-intensive sectors,
relative to comparable communities without broadband at that time."').
91 Id.
92 See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416 (codified in scattered provisions of 47
U.S.C.); see also THORNE ET AL., supra note 4, at 30. The 1934 Act, as amended, is divided into seven
titles. Under Title I are "general provisions," which includes the purposes of the Act, definitions, the
establishment of the Commission and the structure and operations of the Commission. Title II are
"Common Carriers" provisions, Title III are provisions relating to radio, Title IV are administrative and
procedural provisions, Title V are penal provisions, Title VI are provisions related to cable, and Title
VII contains miscellaneous provisions. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416.
93 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).
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allowing it to regulate with the purpose of making available to all the
people of the U.S. "a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and
radio communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable
charges." 94 The Act also charges the Commission with responsibility for
enforcing its provisions.95
Title II of the 1934 Act authorized the Commission to regulate common
carriers. 96 A common carrier is an entity that offers a service to the general
public. It merely transports information; it does not control the content of
what it transmits.97 When Congress enacted the 1934 Act, common carriers
included telephone and telegraph companies. 98 The Commission enjoyed
significant authority over common carriers; for example, Title II allowed
the Commission to control entry and exit of common carriers into the
market, 99 and even prescribe depreciation rates and accounting systems
used by common carriers.lOO Common carriers could charge only
reasonable ratesl 01 and could not discriminate between customers in terms
of their prices. 102
Newer technologies like cable eventually emerged, and although the
1934 Act did not give the Commission express authority to regulate this
technology, the doctrine of "ancillary jurisdiction" was used initially to
allow the Commission to regulate it.103 Under 47 U.S.C. § 154, "[t]he
Commission may perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations, and issue such orders, not inconsistent with this chapter, as
may be necessary in the execution of its functions." 104 In United States v.
Southwestern Cable Co.,105 the Supreme Court construed this provision to
give the Commission the authority to take regulatory action "reasonably
ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 THORNE ET AL., supra note 4, at 31.
97 Id. The Communications Act does not define the term "common carrier" except to state that a
common carrier means "any person engaged as a common carrier for hire . 47 U.S.C. § 153(11)
(2012).
98 THORNE ET AL., supra note 4, at 31.
99 47 U.S.C. § 204 (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 214 (2012).
100 47 U.S.C. § 220 (2012).
101 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
102 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2012).
103 See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 600 F.3d 642, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (describing
a series of cases in which the Supreme Court held that the Commission may use its ancillary authority
to regulate cable television despite the Commission's lack of express statutory authority).
104 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2012).
105 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
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responsibilities." 106 Eventually the Commission was given direct statutory
authority over cable with the Cable Communications Act of 1984.107
B. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The next major telecommunications reform occurred when Congress
passed the 1996 Act.108 A basic understanding of the policies and
provisions of this Act is necessary before exploring how broadband has
been applied to this framework.
The 1996 Act amended the 1934 Act,109 with the ultimate purpose of
encouraging greater competition in telecommunications markets.110
Congress eventually hoped to encourage long term competition that is
"facilities based," which means that each company offering
telecommunications services would provide services over facilities that it
owns, as opposed to leasing facilities from incumbent (existing) service
providers.Il The idea was to use regulation to help new start-up
telecommunications service providers entering the market by overcoming
barriers to entry. Eventually the telecommunications market was
deregulated once multiple companies were competing in local markets
using their own facilities. 112 To encourage competition, Congress added
several provisions to Title II of the 1934 Act that contained additional
regulatory tools for the Commission to use. 113
Section 251 of the 1996 Act allows start-up companies to lease existing
facilities from incumbent service providers. This leasing arrangement is
designed to allow new companies to enter the telecommunications market
and overcome the high barriers to entry and economies of scale that exist in
the market.114 By leasing an incumbent's facilities, the start-ups would
106 Id. at 178.
107 See Pub. L. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (codified in Title VI of 47 U.S.C.).
108 See Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
109 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 37 n.151.
110 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 70.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2012); NUEcHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 70 ("Congress added a
Part II, entitled 'Development of Competitive Markets' to Title II of the Communications Act of
1934."). The 1996 Act left in place the various Titles of the 1934 Act. At the time of the 1996 Act,
those Titles included Title I (General Provisions), Title II (Common Carrier.,), Title 1M1 (Radio), Title IV
(Procedural and Administrative Provisions), Title V (Penal Provisions), Title VI (Cable
Communications). See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 74.
114 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 81; see also 47 U.S.C. § 251 (2006).
Specifically, that Section provides that incumbent telecommunications service providers have "[t]he
duty to provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications
service, nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible
2014
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avoid the high costs of building infrastructure. Over time, as the competitor
leasing these facilities gains its own customers, it might raise enough
capital to build its own network.l1 5 Sections 251 and 252 govern this
process of leasing existing infrastructure, and require the incumbents to
lease facilities on an unbundled basis to new competitors- meaning the
competitor may choose which elements of the incumbent network they
wish to lease.116
It should be noted, however, that the policy of allowing start-ups to lease
facilities from incumbents, sometimes referred to as "local loop
unbundling" was developed as a policy to promote competition in the
telephone industry, not broadband.1 7 Sections 251 and 252 were originally
intended by Congress to apply to telephone companies.1' 8 The provisions
place a number of obligations on "incumbent local exchange carriers"
(ILECs). 119 These were essentially incumbent telephone companies. 120 The
start-up companies seeking to enter the telephone market were referred to
as competitive local exchange carriers, or CLECs.121
Although the competition enforcing provisions of Sections 251 and 252
were not intended to apply to broadband, the policies they provide for -
particularly local loop unbundling - have been part of the broadband policy
debate. In particular, a number of OECD countries have applied
unbundling provisions to broadband in the hopes of ensuring greater
point on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable and nondiscriminatory ... An incumbent
local exchange provider shall provide such unbundled network elements in a manner that allows
requesting carriers to combine such elements in order to provide such telecommunications service." Id.
115 NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 81.
116 Id. The 1996 Act also provided the Commission with a number of other powers. For example,
the Commission was given forbearance authority, which allowed it to exempt a telecommunications
service provider from any Title II regulations if it determined that the regulation was not necessary to
promoting just and reasonable rates, protection of consumers, and that forbearance would be consistent
with the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 160 (2012).
117 OECD, DEVELOPMENTS IN LOCAL Loop UNBUNDLING 4 (2003), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/24/6869228.pdf [hereinafter Developments in LLU] ("Although LLU
began as a policy to promote competition in local telephony, recently it has received attention because
of its role in stimulating broadband development in a number of countries.").
118 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 69 ("[T]he statutory drafters did not fully
anticipate the Internet's radical reordering of the telecommunications industry.").
119 See generally 47 U.S.C. § 251 (describing the various duties of incumbents pursuant to that
provision).
120 See NUECHTERLEIN & WEISER, supra note 24, at 71 (noting that the Bell companies and other
incumbent telephone companies were ILECs for purposes of the 1996 Act).
121 Id. It should also be noted that the policy of encouraging more CLECs to enter the telephone
market was unsuccessful and largely abandoned by the Commission. See COMMON CAUSE EDUC.
FUND, THE FALLOUT FROM THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 8 (2005), available at
http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7BFB3Cl 7E2-CDDI -4DF6-92BE-
BD4429893665%7D/FALLOUT FROMTHETELECOMMACT_5-9-05.PDF ("They also resulted
from the failure of new companies that raised hundreds of billions of dollars to enter the local telephone
business .... ").
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competition.122 In addition, some groups have advocated applying the
competition enforcing provisions of Sections 251 and 252 to broadband in
the U.S.123 It is unclear whether the Commission could apply these
provisions to Broadband in the absence of Congressional action. 124
C. Regulation of Broadband Internet Access
Central to the current debate over the proper legal and regulatory theory
to apply to broadband is the "telecommunications services" and
"information services" distinction created by the 1996 Act.125 The term
"telecommunications services" denotes a transmission of information
whose destination and content are controlled solely by the user, while
"information services" means the offering of a capability for obtaining
information. 126 "Telecommunications services" are subject to the common
carrier regulations of Title II, while "information services" are exempt. 127 It
was generally assumed, however, that products classified as "information
services" could still be regulated by the Commission under its ancillary
jurisdiction.128
122 See Developments in LLU, supra note 117, at 4 ("[M]ost OECD governments have based their
policies for expanding broadband infrastructures and services on the development of competition based
on a framework which ensures fair and non-discriminatory conditions of access to network resources..
. . [M]any regulators have in recent years expanded these frameworks to ensure that new facility-based
entrants and Internet service providers can compete with incumbents in offering broadband access and
services.").
123 See Michael Weinberg, The FCC's Berkman Study is Clear: Broadband Unbundling Expands
Competition, Increases Access, and Creates Jobs, PUB. KNOWLEDGE (Nov. 18, 2009),
http://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/fccas-berkman-study-clear-broadband-unbundlin
("[C]reating conditions for real competition between broadband providers benefits consumers. Not only
that, but it encourages the construction of the infrastructure required to bring true high-speed Internet to
more people .... [O]ne of the most important elements of successful broadband regulation is something
called 'unbundling."') (emphasis omitted).
124 See Austin Schlick, A Third-Way Legal Framework for Addressing the Comcast Dilemma,
BROADBAND.GOV (May 6, 2010), http://www.broadband.gov/third-way-legal-framework-for-
addressing-the-comcast-dilemma.html.
125 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 42.
126 See 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) ("The term 'telecommunications' means the transmission, between or
among points specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received."); id. § 153(46) ("The term 'telecommunications
service' means the offering of telecommunications for a fee directly to the public ... regardless of the
facilities used."); id. § 153(20) ("The term 'information service' means the offering of a capability for
generating, acquiring, storing, processing, retrieving, utilizing, or making available information via
telecommunications ...but does not include any use of any such capability for the management,
control, or operation of a telecommunications system .. .
127 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 42.
128 See Julius Genachowski, The Third Way: A Narrowly Tailored Broadband Framework,
BROADBAND.GOV (May 6, 2010), http://www.broadband.gov/the-third-way-narrowly-tailored-
broadband-framework-chairman-julius-genachowski.html [hereinafter FCC Third Way] (As a result of
classifying broadband as an "information service," "broadband became a type of service over which the
Commission could exercise only indirect 'ancillary' authority ... ").
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When broadband Interet connections first became available, the
Commission had to determine whether to classify these connections as
"telecommunications services," and thereby subject them to Title II
regulations. The Commission first addressed the issue in 2002 when it
issued an order classifying cable modems as "information services." 129 The
Supreme Court upheld this order.130 For a brief period, then, cable was
exempt from Title II requirements, while DSL companies were subject to
unbundling requirements in the 1996 Act.131 The Commission later
determined that both cable and DSL should be classified as "information
services," eliminating any difference in regulatory treatment between the
two services. 132
The Commission subsequently expanded this policy of classifying
broadband as "information services" to additional platforms. In 2005, the
Commission issued an order classifying all facilities-based wireline
broadband as an "information service." 133 This order applied to all
broadband service providers, regardless of platform or technology used. 134
This policy of deregulation was further extended when Verizon filed a
petition for forbearance from Title II regulations of broadband services,
which was granted by the Commission in 2006.135 The Commission has
also classified wireless broadband as information services. 136 The result of
all of these actions has been to create a unified status across all platforms
for broadband as "information services" that are exempt from Title II
regulations. 137
However, the Commission did not leave broadband completely
129 In re Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable & Other Facilities, 17
FCC Rcd. 4798, 4832 (2002), affd in part, vacated in part sub nom. Brand X Internet Servs. v. Fed.
Commc'ns Comm'n, 345 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v.
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
130 Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n, 545 U.S. at 996-97.
131 Kevin Werbach, Off The Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REv. 535,544 (2010).
132 Id.
133 In re Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Wireline Facilities, 20
FCC Rcd. 14853, 14856 (2005). This order was subsequently challenged in the courts, and was upheld
in Time Warner Telecom, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 507 F.3d 205, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).
134 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 45 n.205.
135 FCC Announces that Verizon Petition for Forbearance is Deemed Granted, TECH L.J., (Mar.
21, 2006), http://www.techlawjoumal.com/topstories/2006/20060321.asp. Verizon had needed to ask
for forbearance from common-carriage requirements because some of its commercial broadband
services had not been expressly addressed in the 2005 Wireline Order. See FTC Report, supra note 21,
at 46.
136 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 139.
137 Id. Of course, as the Commission had the power to classify broadband as an "information
service" it could validly reverse itself and reclassify broadband as a "telecommunication service." Such
action would likely be challenged in the courts, and the Commission would need to defend its decision
in order to have it sustained.
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unregulated, rather it attempted to exercise some authority over broadband
pursuant to its ancillary jurisdiction.138 A test of the extent of this authority
came in Comcast v. FCC,139 in which the Commission asserted its ancillary
jurisdiction to issue an order requiring Comcast, a provider of broadband,
to disclose the details of how it planned to handle traffic over its
network.140 Just as in Southwestern Cable, the Commission argued that
while it did not have direct statutory authority to regulate broadband, this
order fell within its authority under 47 U.S.C. § 154. The court in Comcast
rejected the Commission's argument that it had authority to issue the order
under its ancillary jurisdiction.141 The court reasoned that the
Commission's ancillary authority is limited to actions that allow it to carry
out its responsibilities under the Communications Act - in other words, the
ancillary authority can be used only to carry out or to further an express
provision of the Communications Act. 142 The Commission asserted that the
ancillary authority invoked in Comcast carried out the responsibilities of
several statutes, 143 but the Court rejected each of these arguments, stating
that the statutes cited by the Commission were merely statements of
Congressional policy, which could not be used to sustain a claim of
ancillary jurisdiction.144
For example the Commission cited 47 U.S.C. § 230(b), 145 which
expresses Congress' goal that technologies should be developed to give
Internet users control over their personal information.146 The Commission
argued that its order in Comcast was "ancillary" to carrying out this
statutory provision.147 However, the court rejected this argument, finding
that § 230(b) is a "statement[] of policy that.. . delegate[s] no regulatory
138 Lee L. Selwyn & Helen E. Golding, Revisiting the Regulatory Status of Broadband Internet
Access: A Policy Framework for Net Neutrality and An Open Competitive Internet, 63 FED. COMM. L.J.
91, 100 (2010).
139 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
140 Id. at 644-45.
141 Id. at 644.
142 Id. at 646 ("The Commission ... may exercise ancillary jurisdiction only when . ..the
regulations are reasonably ancillary to the Commission's effective performance of its statutorily
mandated responsibilities.").
143 Id. at 652.
144 Id. at 654. Of course, as was noted above, the D.C. Circuit reversed itself in the recent Verizon
case, holding that the Commission's interpretation of Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act to
provide some substantive authority to the Commission to regulate broadband was reasonable. Verizon,
No. 11-1355, at 4. Nonetheless, the D.C. Circuit did not clarify the limits of this authority.
145 Section 230 provides, in relevant part, "[I]t is the policy of the United States ... [to] maximize
user control over what information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the
Intemet." 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
146 Id.
147 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 651.
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authority."148 Other statutes cited by the Commission, including Section
706(a) of the Telecommunications Act, were similarly rejected as mere
statements of policy that did not grant substantive regulatory authority to
the Commission over Broadband.149 The court therefore rejected the
Commission's assertion of ancillary jurisdiction, stating "policy statements
alone cannot provide the basis for the Commission's exercise of ancillary
authority."150 As a result of Comcast, it is uncertain whether the
Commission has any authority to regulate broadband given the current
legal framework.
III. FCC "THIRD WAY" APPROACH AND SECTION 706 - Two
ALTERNATIVES
This section begins by discussing the Commission's "Third Way"
proposal in response to Comcast, and describing where it falls short in
addressing the need for faster broadband speeds and lower prices. It then
discuses Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, and why it
could be used to solve the current uncertainty surrounding the appropriate
legal framework to apply to broadband described in the preceding section.
A. Examining the "Third Way"
The aftermath of the Comcast decision has led to a crossroads for the
Commission, in that it is now faced with the task of finding a new legal
basis for regulating broadband, and has two very different approaches it
could take. 151 It could continue to assert ancillary authority as justification
for regulatory measures like the one at issue in Comcast and risk having
reviewing courts overturn any action the Commission takes, or it could
reverse the course it began in 2002 and reclassify broadband as a
"telecommunications service."1 52 However, the Commission identified and
proposed a "third way" approach. 153
Under the "Third Way" approach that the Commission announced in
2010, the Commission would first issue an order reclassifying broadband as
a "telecommunications service," subjecting it to Title II regulation.154 This
148 Id. at 652.
149 Id. at 658.
150 Id. at 654.





would give the Commission the solid legal foundation it would need to
regulate broadband, as broadband would now be subject to the express
provisions of Title 11.155 Second, the Commission would then use its
forbearance authority under Section 160 to exempt broadband from most of
the Title II regulations it would have otherwise been subject to due to the
reclassification.1 5 6 Only a handful of Title II provisions would then be
applied to broadband, but those provisions would be enough for the
Commission to achieve its regulatory goals. 157
Under the Title II provisions that the Commission would apply to
broadband under the Third Way plan, the Commission would be able to
require broadband providers to charge reasonable rates to customers and
prevent discrimination in charges or access among customers. It would not
have the authority, however, to require incumbent broadband providers to
permit unbundled access to competitors, or to allow competitors to
purchase other telecommunications services from incumbents for resale.
Thus, while it would protect consumers from direct discrimination by
broadband providers, it would not foster competition under the "Third
Way" approach.
The Commission argued that this "Third Way" would allow it to have
sound legal authority to impose regulations applicable to broadband, while
leaving the market largely de-regulated and exempt from the burdensome
common carrier provisions in Title 11. 158 The Commission is of the opinion
that this approach provides a solid middle ground between over-regulation
and deregulation.
The major shortcoming with this approach, however, is that it does little
to promote greater competition in broadband markets, and thus, faster
speeds and lower prices. In fact, in proposing the "Third Way" approach,
the Commission expressly disclaimed any intent or authority to implement
measures that would introduce new competitors into the broadband
market. 159 While § 201 does allow the Commission to ensure that





159 See Schlick, supra note 124. This proposal would not give the Commission the authority to
implement unbundling requirements on incumbent providers. See id. In fact, the Commission
specifically noted that classifying broadband as a Title I service would still not give it the authority to
require network unbundling under Section 251 (c). Id. Thus, even if it wanted to implement unbundling
under its Third Way plan, it could not.
160 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
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the Commission explained that they would not use this authority to
implement "monopoly era price regulation."161 Without the authority to
take measures that directly promote competition in the broadband market,
the Commission will not be able to work towards providing consumers
with faster speeds and lower prices. As a result, a different approach is
needed.
B. Legislative History of Section 706
Rather than follow the Third Way approach, this Note proposes an
alternative, that Congress should amend Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act. Among the arguments made by the Commission
in Comcast was that Section 706162 of the 1996 Act gave it authority over
broadband. 163 That statute provides, in relevant part:
The Commission... shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all
Americans... by utilizing, in a manner consistent with the public
interest, convenience, and necessity, price cap regulation, regulatory
forbearance, measures that promote competition in the local
telecommunications market, or other regulating methods that remove
barriers to infrastructure investment. 164
The term "advanced telecommunications capability" includes broadband
access.165
On its face, Section 706 would seem to provide the Commission with the
authority to regulate competition in the broadband market. However, as the
Comcast court explained, the Commission was bound by an earlier order it
had made that construed this provision as merely a statement of policy,
which did not confer any substantive regulatory authority on the
Commission.166 Section 706 merely required that the Commission use its
authority granted under other statutes to encourage the deployment of
advanced telecommunications. 167 The Comcast court did not engage in any
161 Schlick, supra note 124.
162 47 U.S.C. § 1302.
163 Comcast v. Fed. Comms'ns Comm'n, 600 F.3d 642, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
164 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a).
165 See In Re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
Capability, 13 FCC Rcd. 24012, 24016 (1998) (discussing "advanced services," as including "faster
access to the Internet"); see generally 47 U.S.C. § 1302(d).
166 Comcast, 600 F.3d at 658-59. The Commission stated specifically that "[S]ection 706(a) does
not constitute an independent grant of forbearance authority or of authority to employ other regulating
methods." Id. at 659.
167 Id. at 658.
RESHAPING THE LAST MiLE
independent analysis of Section 706 to determine if this interpretation of
Section 706 was warranted, because it asserted that the Commission had
never overruled its earlier interpretation construing Section 706 as a
statement of policy, and that agencies "may not ... depart from a prior
policy sub silentio."168 The Commission was therefore bound by its earlier
interpretation. Section 706 alone was insufficient to grant the Commission
authority to regulate broadband and thus to enact policies that can
encourage faster speeds and lower broadband prices.
The legislative history of Section 706 supports the Commission's initial
conclusion that the statute was merely a statement of Congressional policy.
A Senate Report discussing the provision explained that it "is intended to
ensure that one of the primary objectives of the bill - to accelerate
deployment of advanced telecommunications capability - is achieved." 169
The report states further "this provision is a necessary fail-safe to ensure
that the bill achieves its intended infrastructure objective."170 These
statements focus not on any substantive regulatory authority, but rather
discuss furthering "objectives," which underscores the idea that the Section
706 merely sets forth policies Congress wanted to encourage.
Furthermore, much of the legislative history focuses on the substantive
provision in Section 706, contained in paragraph (b), which requires the
Commission to issue an annual notice of inquiry concerning the availability
of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans.171
Consequently, little legislative history exists to suggest that this provision
grants any independent statutory authority for the regulation of
competition. Therefore, Section 706, as currently interpreted by the
Comcast court, does not do anything beyond collecting information that
would promote faster speeds or lower prices.
C. Section 706 Policies as Applied to the Broadband Market
Section 706, as has been noted by courts, is broadly worded. 172
Accordingly, several policies could be implemented consistent with the
statute that would serve to help promote competition, and consequently
168 Id. at 659.
169 S. Rep. No. 104-23, at 50 (1995).
170 Id.
171 See, e.g., Sen. Conf. Rep. 104-23, *50 ("[Section 706] ensures that advanced
telecommunications capability is promptly deployed by requiring the Commission to initiate and
complete regular inquiries to determine whether advanced telecommunications capability .. . is being
deployed in a 'reasonable and timely fashion."').
172 See Ad Hoc. Telecom. Users Comm. v. Fed. Commc'ns..Comm'n, 572 F.3d 903, 906 (D.C. Cir.
2009) ("Section 706 speaks in very broad terms ... ."); Comcast, 600 F.3d at 659.
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reduce prices and increase speeds for broadband access.
One measure the Commission should use to promote greater competition
in the market for broadband is mandating that incumbent broadband
providers allow competitors to lease their facilities on an unbundled basis,
as "telecommunications services" are required to do under Section 251.173
One of the particularly compelling reasons to consider unbundling of
broadband network elements is that the broadband market is currently
characterized both by high levels of demand from consumers, and high
market shares held by incumbent broadband providers. 7 4 As a result, new
companies that enter the market for broadband will have a chance to take
advantage of this growing demand and prevent existing providers from
further dominating the market. If new broadband providers are able to
overcome the barriers to entry with the use of unbundling, and compete
with incumbents over market share for existing broadband customers, that
would discipline incumbents into reducing their prices or improving their
speeds to compete for market share. Finally, to ensure that start-ups are
able to gain access to all the facilities necessary to enter the broadband
market, a provision should be added that allows for regular access to
incumbent facilities, allowing them to lease any other facilities that cannot
be accessed on an unbundled basis. The provision should apply to any
facilities necessary to providing a broadband service.
Another provision that would encourage greater competition in the
broadband market is to allow competitors to purchase broadband services
from incumbents at wholesale rates, and then re-sell them to their own
customers. Such a provision is similar to the duty imposed on ILECs under
Section 251(4). Once the start-up is able to resell the incumbents'
broadband service, the start-up can try to compete with the incumbent by
improving some other aspect of the service, such as administrative
efficiency, customer service, billing, or marketing. 175 By lowering the high
entry barriers in the creation of broadband, start-ups would better be able to
compete and improve non-technical aspects of the service. This
competition will cause incumbents to ensure their non-technical services
are just as efficient as their competitors, and will most likely result in lower
prices for customers.
173 See supra Part II.B.
174 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 152.
175 BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOCY, NEXT GENERATION CONNECTIVITY: A REVIEW OF
BROADBAND INTERNET TRANSITIONS AND POLICY FROM AROUND THE WORLD, 77 (2009), available at
http://transition.fcc.gov/stage/pdf/Berkman Center-BroadbandStudy_ 130ct09.pdf [hereinafter
Berkman Center Report].
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For these policies to be effective, the Commission must have the
authority to ensure that incumbent providers do not charge unreasonable
rates to their competitors for access to the incumbents' facilities. Sections
251 and 252 impose obligations on incumbents to negotiate in good faith
with start-ups, and to set rates, terms and conditions for access that are just,
reasonable and nondiscriminatory. Similarly, any provision for broadband
should ensure that the Commission can require incumbents and start-ups to
negotiate in good faith for the purpose of reaching leasing or resale
agreements, and to make sure that the terms of such agreements are just
and reasonable. In this way, incumbents could not stifle competition by
simply charging excessively high rates for unbundled access or resale.
Adding new competitors to the market will cause prices to decline. For
example, as DSL broadband providers tried to take market share from cable
companies, one tactic they used was to decrease prices. 176 A 2003 report by
the OECD concluded that most countries believe local-loop unbundling has
the potential to enhance competition and thereby reduce broadband
prices. 177 By adding new competitors to the broadband market, those
competitors act as a sort of "catalyst," encouraging incumbent providers to
lower prices and improve broadband performance. 178
Finally, the Commission should also have the authority to prevent
incumbent broadband providers from unjustly discriminating among
customers. For example, a broadband provider should not be able to
provide service at a certain rate for one customer, while charging a higher
rate for a different customer for no reason. A provision similar to Section
202,179 if adopted, would prevent incumbent broadband providers from
"unjust or unreasonable discrimination" in providing services or setting
prices for customers. Of course, incumbents should be allowed to charge
higher costs to those customers to whom providing infrastructure would be
more costly. However, they should not be permitted to simply deny access
or charge higher rates to a customer without a legitimate, cost-related
purpose for doing so.
176 FTC Report, supra note 21, at 101.
177 Developments in LLU, supra note 117, at 5.
178 Berkman Center Report, supra note 174, at 12 ("We find that in countries where an engaged
regulator enforced open access obligations, competitors that entered using these open access facilities
provided and important catalyst for the development of robust competition which, in most cases,
contributed to strong broadband performance across a range of metrics.").
179 47 U.S.C. § 202.
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IV. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO SECTION 706
This Section will discuss a proposed amendment to Section 706 that
would grant the Commission the authority to implement the policies
discussed in the previous section.
A. Proposed Amendment to Section 706
To grant the Commission authority to impose the regulations described
in the previous section, Congress should amend Section 706 of the 1996
Act to provide the Commission with express jurisdiction over broadband.
The following is the proposed text of the amendment to Section 706, which
would be inserted as subsection (e):
(e) Broadband Internet Service.
(1) If the Commission determines that taking regulatory action
would promote competition, it shall have the authority to take such
action with respect to Broadband Internet Service. Such regulatory
action may include requiring that incumbent broadband providers:
i) provide access to their facilities to competitors on an unbundled
basis, ii) offer for resale to competitors at wholesale rates their
broadband service that they provide at retail to subscribers, iii)
provide access to any other facilities necessary for the provision of
Broadband Internet Service. Such unbundled access or resale rates
shall be on rates, terms and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory. Incumbent broadband providers shall negotiate
in good faith with competitors with respect to the terms and
conditions of such access or resale rates.
(2) If the Commission, having implemented such regulatory
action, subsequently determines that sufficient competition in the
market for Broadband Internet Service exists, it shall forbear from
applying any of the regulatory actions to incumbent broadband
service providers.
(3) It shall be unlawful for any Broadband Internet Service to
make any unjust or unreasonable charges, practices, classifications,
regulations, facilities or services, directly or indirectly, or to
unjustly or unreasonably discriminate in the provision of any
service, by any means or device, or to make or give any undue or
unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person, class
of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of
persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage.
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The Commission would presumably be able to implement any of these
policies using its standard rulemaking procedures. In addition, the
legislation would also give the Commission regulatory flexibility, allowing
it to use its forbearance authority to exempt a company from regulations if
it determined such regulations were no longer necessary to ensuring
sufficient competition in the broadband market. The last two sentences of
paragraph (1) provide that incumbent broadband providers cannot
discriminate or charge unreasonable rates to competitors in granting access
to their facilities, and that they must negotiate in good faith with respect to
the terms of such access. The Commission would be able to ensure that the
incumbents abide by this requirement by reviewing and voiding any
agreements reached between incumbents and start-ups that violate the
statutory requirements. Finally, paragraph (3) includes a non-discrimination
provision that tracks the language of Section 202, and would allow the
Commission to ensure that broadband providers do not unreasonably
discriminate among customers or charge unreasonable or unjust rates.
Because the language used in paragraph (3) is general, it would allow for
the Commission to enact rules or regulations prohibiting all sorts of
discrimination that is unjust. Of particular interest is prohibiting
discrimination based on income, so that broadband providers could not
charge higher rates to higher income levels merely because that group can
afford to pay more. Paragraph (3) would also allow the Commission to
ensure that broadband providers do not charge unjust or unreasonable rates
to customers.
This amendment would be consistent with the policies underlying
Section 706. As has been noted, Section 706(b) contains a provision
mandating that the Commission take regulatory action if it determines that
deployment of advanced telecommunications capabilities has stalled. 180
The legislative history of the Act further explains that the purpose of the
provision is to employ incentives to spur competition in advanced
telecommunications markets where such competition is lacking.181
Similarly, the Commission would be required to make a predicate factual
180 See 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b).
181 See NTIA Letter on Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, NAT'L TELECOMM.
INFO. ADMIN. n.6 (July 17, 1998), http://www.ntia.doc.gov/fcc-filing/1998/ntia-letter-section-706-
telecommunications-act-1996 ("Incentives for deployment of advanced telecommunications will be
employed in areas where competition does not occur."); see also 142 Cong. Rec. S700 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1996), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/fcc-filing/1998/ntia-letter-section-706-telecommunications-
act-1996 (Statement of Sen. Bums) ("If competition is stalled, the [bill] gives the FCC authority to
quicken the pace of competition and deregulation to accelerate the deployment of advanced
telecommunications infrastructure.").
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determination that taking regulatory action would spur competition before
implementing any of the actions listed in the amendment. This requirement
ensures that all parties that have an interest in broadband services -
telecommunications companies, consumer groups, local governments -
may be heard before any regulation is issued by mandating that notice and
comment procedures are followed.
This amendment would also be consistent with the broader policies
underlying the Telecommunications Act of 1996. As has already been
discussed, the underlying purpose behind the Act is to promote competition
and deregulation by granting the Commission the authority to use
regulations to promote long-term facilities based competition, eventually
rolling back regulations once this has been established. 182 Here, the
Commission can use its authority under the provision to stimulate
competition by taking regulatory actions, and also has the authority to
repeal such regulations either by promulgating new rules or by using its
forbearance authority.
Finally, it would also most likely promote greater adoption rates, a
central concern underlying Section 706, by promoting competition, which
would reduce prices and increase connection speeds, addressing the reasons
cited for low U.S. adoption rates.
B. Comparison to Alternative Proposals
In light of the importance of Broadband to the 21 " century economy, it is
not surprising that scholars and commentators have proposed a number of
recommendations that have the same overall goal - as amending Section
706 - granting the Commission express authority over broadband.
a. Option One: Status Quo
One option that has been advocated by broadband providers and others
has been to simply keep things the way they are. 183 Proponents of this
182 See supra Part H.B.
183 See Tony Bradley, FCC "Third Way" Compromise Challenged, PCWORLD (May 7, 2010 11:23
AM),
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/195848/fcc third waycompromise challenged.html
(noting that Broadband providers affected by the FCC Third Way proposal have voiced opposition to
reclassifying Broadband); Ivan Seidenberg, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, Verizon
Communications, A Conversation with Ivan Seidenberg (Apr. 2010), available at
http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/conversation-ivan-seidenberg/p21840 [hereinafter A
Conversation with Ivan Seidenberg] ("[W]e have to be careful that well-intentioned, high-level policy
issues don't turn into burdensome rules and regulations that will just stifle growth and innovation.").
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approach argue that regulation would stifle growth and innovation. 184 The
argument provides that imposing regulations increases costs for broadband
providers, which reduces the incentives of companies to make investments
in the United States.185 However, the broadband market is currently
characterized by increasing data consumption and hence, increasing
demand. 186 The Commission has pointed out that increased demand fuels
creation of new applications, which in turn require greater bandwidth, and
hence requires increased capacity to meet this growing demand.
Accordingly, broadband providers will have adequate incentives to
continue to invest in infrastructure so long as this demand continues to rise,
because it promises increased profits. Moreover, the regulatory flexibility
built into this proposed amendment gives incentives for long-term facilities
based competition by requiring that the Commission eliminate these
regulations once sufficient competition has been achieved. Therefore, once
a broadband market in a certain area has robust competition among several
broadband providers, the Commission would be mandated by the statute to
forbear from applying any further competition-forcing provisions. 187
b. Option Two: Full Title II Regulation
It has also been proposed that the Commission should reclassify
broadband as a telecommunications service and apply the full range of Title
II regulations to broadband. 188 Proponents of this approach argue that the
full range of Title II provisions is necessary to achieve greater deployment
of broadband.' 89 However this approach has too many detrimental
consequences to be preferable to amending Section 706. First, applying
Title II would subject broadband to a statutory scheme that was not
designed for broadband, and which as a result is not as well suited to the
184 See A Conversation with Ivan Seidenberg, supra note 182.
185 Id.
186 See supra Part I.
187 This concept of only regulating if the market is lacking in effective competition is not novel. In
fact, Congress has already used this approach in regulating Cable Television. The Cable Television
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 provides that "[i]f the Commission finds that a cable
system is subject to effective competition, the rates for the provision of cable service by such system
shall not be subject to regulation by the Commission .... 47 U.S.C. § 543(a)(2) (2012). By contrast, if
the Commission finds that a cable system is not subject to effective competition, either the Commission
or a local franchising authority may set rates for the provision of cable service. Id. The approach under
this amendment would be the same. If competition was found to be sufficient using a measure
prescribed by the Commission, then it would not have the authority to take regulatory action, although
the action taken here would be different than setting rates for services.
188 See generally Craig Aaron, FCC Action Will Not Protect Free Speech Online, FREE PRESS
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task of regulating the broadband market. 190 For example, cable modems
provide an array of services that resemble services that were traditionally
governed under various titles in the Communications Act prior to
broadband. Cable modem services are provided through cable facilities,
which are governed by Title VI of the Act, and they allow for applications
such as voice telephone services and streaming video that were
traditionally regulated under Titles II and III, respectively. 191 The
distinctions reflected in the various titles of the Communications Act are
largely arbitrary in the age of convergence - where different services can
be provided over different technologies. 192 Therefore, reclassifying
broadband as a "telecommunications service" and subjecting it to the full
array of Title II provisions perpetuates an outdated scheme that was not
designed to address the current convergent marketplace.
Moreover, Title II regulations have been shown to be particularly
burdensome, and imposing these regulations risk higher costs for
consumers. Traditional common carrier regulation under Title II imposes a
number of regulations on "telecommunications services" that essentially
allows the Commission to manage the internal affairs of a company,193
including prescribing accounting systems to be used, 194 and regulating who
can hold the position of an officer or director of a common carrier. 195 Such
regulations are unduly burdensome and are not necessary to achieve the
goals of increasing competition in the broadband market. Finally, as noted
before, it is not even clear that the Commission would have the authority to
apply the competition-forcing provisions of the 1996 Act even if it did
190 See NUECHTERLEIN AND WEISER, supra note 24, at 73 ("Because Congress [in passing the 1996
Act] did not foresee that cable and telephone companies would compete in this market, [for broadband
internet access] it did not set forth a clear regulatory framework for that market - let alone how to
ensure regulatory parity between these competing platforms .... " ); Alan Pearce et al., Telecom Act
Rewrite is Needed to Return Real Competition To Broadband Sector, BLOOMBERG L.,
http://about.bloomberglaw.com/practitioner-contributions/telecom-act-rewrite-needed/ (last visited,
Feb. 20, 2013).
191 NUECHTERLEIN AND WEISER, supra note 24, at 162-63.
192 Id. at 73 ("[In the 1996 Act] Congress largely left in place the arbitrarily compartmentalized
regulation of the industry reflected in the multiple "Titles" of the Communications Act. That approach.
. . subjects distinct last mile transmission platforms to radically different forms of regulation on the
assumption that those platforms will not be used in competition with one another. Now that the growth
of Internet technologies has undermined that assumption for good .... "). Consequently, further relying
on the outdated distinctions made by the various Titles of the 1934 Act serves to further perpetuate an
outdated scheme.
193 See supra Part II.A. Section 218 provides that "[t]he Commission may inquire into the
management of the business of all carriers subject to [Title 11], and shall keep itself informed as to the
manner and method in which the same is conducted." 47 U.S.C. § 218.
194 See 47 U.S.C. § 220(a).
195 See 47 U.S.C. § 212 (2012).
RESHAPING THE LAST MLE
apply the full range of Title II regulations. 196
c. Option Three: Commission's Third Way
Another proposal is the Commission's Third Way Plan, which would
reclassify the transmission aspect of broadband as a telecommunications
service and apply limited provisions of Title II to broadband.197 However,
the Commission has emphasized that it would not apply many of the
provisions in Title II that promote competition, such as Section 251.198 As
a result this proposal would not accomplish the specific task of allowing
the FCC to encourage lower prices or faster speeds.
d. Option Four: New Title of Communications Act
It has also been proposed that Congress should draft more
comprehensive legislation that would create a new Title of the
Communications Act specifically addressing broadband.199  One
commentator has proposed, "Congress should amend the Communications
Act to add a new Title that creates a limited and specific set of regulatory
requirements applicable to Internet access providers. '200 Such requirements
proposed under the new Title would presumably include some mandate that
the Commission regulate competition among broadband providers. 201
It is true that were Congress to enact such legislation it would be able to
grant the Commission firm authority to regulate the broadband market
while also avoiding the outdated framework of Title II. However, such
legislation likely would take a much greater amount of time to enact than
the legislation proposed here. First, Congress is notoriously slow to act
with comprehensive reforms - for example, it took nearly twenty years
between the time cable television was developed and the time when
Congress granted the Commission express authority to regulate Cable with
the Cable Act of 1984, adding a new Title to the Communications Act.202
As mentioned before, Congress's failure to act to give the Commission
authority over cable led to its usage of ancillary jurisdiction to regulate the
196 See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
197 See supra Part II.
198 See FCC Third Way, supra note 128.
199 See Rob Frieden, Legislative and Regulatory Strategies for Providing Consumer Safeguards in




202 See THORNE ET AL., supra note 4, at 12 ("For two decades, the FCC made up its own
jurisdictional theories for cable. Congress finally took charge with the Cable Act of 1984.").
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medium.2 03 The legislation proposed here would be much less
comprehensive and hence would be able to be enacted much more
quickly. 204 While it could be argued that a less comprehensive statute
would give too much authority to the Commission, because of the
importance of the problem as described in Part I, it is essential that
government act quickly to address it, and more comprehensive legislation
is a difficult task politically, which will take more time.
In addition, a less comprehensive statute provides more flexibility to the
Commission to change regulatory approaches. A comprehensive statute
passed by Congress that provides a detailed list of measures for the
Commission to implement can only be altered by another act of Congress.
However, a less comprehensive statute allows the Commission to change
policies by either an order or issuing a rule, since a less comprehensive
statute like the one proposed here gives the Commission discretion over
what measures to implement in regulating broadband.
CONCLUSION
Broadband is an important and increasingly essential product that
consumers must have access to in order to fully participate in modem
society. However, recent studies have indicated that the United States is
behind many other advanced countries in providing consumers with higher
speed broadband connections, and in providing access at lower prices. The
result is that home broadband adoption among citizens of the United States
is at lower rates than many other countries that make up the OECD. In
addition, potential new economic advantages and advanced applications
that result from high-speed broadband access risk becoming lost to other
nations if the United States fails to keep up. While some of the disparity in
broadband performance between the United States and other nations can be
explained by differences in geography and population density, some
research by the Commission has suggested that even when these factors are
taken into account, the United States is still behind.
An important factor that does account for some of this disparity in
broadband performance is competition. Robust competition between
broadband providers would create incentives for providers to offer the best
service possible (by, among other things, investing in infrastructure to
203 See supra Part II.A.
204 See, e.g., Matthew M. Greenberg, The Communications Act: The Need for Tariff Reform, 9
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 847, 895 ("Enacting comprehensive telecommunications legislation is a politically
awesome task.").
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allow for higher connection speeds) and the lowest prices. Unfortunately,
the broadband market in the United States currently shares the
characteristics of an oligopoly - with the majority of Americans living in
markets with two providers. Because broadband, like the telephone before
it, is a service that has high barriers to entry because of the enormous initial
investments required to create infrastructure, new competitors will not be
able to enter the market without assistance from the government.
Therefore, the Commission should be given the authority to implement
several measures to encourage greater competition in the broadband
market. Such measures should include allowing new start-up companies to
lease access to incumbent providers' facilities both on an unbundled and
regular basis, and allow start-ups to re-sell entire services provided by
incumbents on a wholesale basis.
The best way to provide such tools given the current legal framework is
to adopt new legislation amending Section 706 of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996. Section 706 already contains Congress's stated objective that
the Commission encourage the deployment of high-speed broadband access
to all Americans by using "measures that promote competition." Hence, an
amendment that would grant the Commission substantive regulatory
authority over competition in the broadband market would be consistent
with the text and purpose of the statute. In addition, amending this
provision avoids the pitfalls of other proposals to reform the Act by
circumventing the "telecommunications service" and "information service"
distinction, which does not provide an adequate middle ground between
complete deregulation and overly burdensome regulation. It would also be
much simpler and efficient than enacting more comprehensive legislation.
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